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UNITED STATES v. PENN-OLIN: CRITERIA
TO DETERMINE A JOINT VENTURE'S
COMPETITIVE EFFECT
INTRODUCTION
In keeping pace with the rapid growth of a developing America,
business associations have increased in size and complexity. This
growth process has resulted in new types of legal arrangements
between organizations, between the men who compose these or-
ganizations, and between the organization's men and others outside
the organization.' Many of these arrangements have anti-competi-
tive effects. Federal antitrust law in general, and section 7 of the
Clayton Act 2 in particular, were enacted to protect competition
from being lessened by corporations combining their strength and
becoming dominant in an industry to the detriment of the public
interest.
The principal form of corporate combination is the merger.
However, in recent years, another form of combination, the joint
venture, has gained popularity.' The joint venture is any associa-
tion between business entities which results in their pooling re-
sources and skills which eventually leads to participation in a
business activity.4 The legal and economic consequences of joint
ventures were brought to public attention by the civil action of
United States v. Penn-Olin.5 Penn-Olin was formed by an agree-
1. Berle, Development in the Pattern of Corporate Joint Enterprise,
14 Bus. LAWYER 309 (1959).
2. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 631
(1914). The pertinent part of which is:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.
3. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 228 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Bok]. Joint
ventures have always been in the shadows of mergers. Just as the joint
venture was acquiring a personality of its own in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, mergers were beginning their first wave of popularity in 1878 with
the Standard Oil Trust. Again after World War II, joint ventures increased
in numbers, but mergers started their third wave of popularity. Conse-
quently, the 1950 Cellar-Kefauver Act amending the Clayton Act was de-
signed to reduce anti-competitive mergers.
4. Tractenburg, Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in
Uncertainty, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 798 (1963).
5. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 114 (D. Del. 1963),
remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), aff'd on remand, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del.
1965), aff'd mem., 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
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ment dated February 11, 1960, between Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corporation and Pennsalt Chemical Corporation. Its purpose was
the manufacture and sale of sodium chlorate in the Southeastern
United States.6 The United States, thereafter, brought a civil ac-
tion to prevent and restrain Penn-Olin Chemical Company, Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation and Pennsalt Chemical Corpora-
tion from allegedly continuing to violate antitrust acts. The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint, and the Supreme Court, after
seven years of litigation, upheld the decision.
The issues raised in Penn-Olin have important future implica-
tions for joint ventures prosecuted under section 7. In determining
whether Penn-Olin was anti-competitive, the following two ques-
tions evolved: (1) Whether section 7 applies to joint ventures? (2)
What concepts and criteria should be used to determine the joint
venture's anti-competitive effect? This second question involves
two subsidiary questions: (a) How is "reasonably probable" to be
interpreted? (b) What weight should be given to "substantial
lessening of competition?"
The first question was conclusively decided by the Supreme
Court: "We have concluded that a joint venture as organized
here would be subject to the regulation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. . .. 'IT The split memorandum decision affirming the district
court's ruling that neither company as a matter of reasonable
probability would have entered the market independently, left the
second question open to considerable debate.8 The failure to clar-
ify the second question is unfortunate in light of the increasing
use of joint ventures. The chemical industry, for example, has
been a leader in the use of joint ventures. In 1960 at least seven-
teen of the fifty-four leading corporations had interests in one or
more joint ventures.9 No other industry has come into conflict
with the antitrust laws as frequently as the chemical industry.10
6. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D. Del.
1963). Sodium chlorate is primarily used in the pulp and paper industry
as a bleaching agent. Olin and Pennsalt are large, diversified companies.
Olin, the larger, with nearly 30% of operating revenue earned by the
chemical division in 1960, had sales of $690,000,000 of which $217,000,000
was generated by the chemical division. Pennsalt is engaged in the pro-
duction of some 400 chemicals and chemical products. In 1960 its sales
amounted to over $90,000,000 on which it earned almost $5,000,000.
7. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161 (1964). The
parent companies argued that section 7 applied only where the acquired
company was engaged in commerce. In deciding that section 7 applied to
joint ventures, the Court found that Penn-Olin was engaged in commerce
at the time of the suit, it was organized to further the business of its
parents already in commerce, and to hold otherwise would be against
legislative intent. Id. at 168.
8. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 386 U.S. 906 (1967).
9. Comment, Joint Subsidiaries and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39
U. DET. L.J. 224 (1962).
10. Kahn, The Chemical Industry, TnE STRucuRsE OF AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY, 252 (2d ed. 1961).
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This Comment will present, organize, and discuss the second
issue, standards by which to evaluate joint ventures, as developed
through Penn-Olin. For purposes of discussion, the development
can be outlined as follows:
A. The traditional merger approach
1. the criteria to be utilized
B. The development of potential competition
C. The criteria to determine reasonable probability of inde-
pendent entry by either firm
1. capability of entry
2. a firm's interest in entry and the historical trend ap-
proach
3. investment process analysis
D. Subjective v. objective criteria
E. Post-joint venture evidence
F. The criteria to determine whether the other firm would
remain a significant potential competitor.
Entwined within a discussion of the pertinent criteria will be
the problems of establishing a "reasonable probability" and "sub-
stantial lessening of competition" as required by section 7.11
BACKGROUND
It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century,
when railroads made extensive use of joint ventures, that this form
of organization began to assume a legal status of its own.' 2 In-
stead of dissolving as a specified project was completed, the joint
venture continued as a permanent arrangement. 13 Two reasons
have been offered for the increased use of joint ventures. The
first was noted by the Supreme Court in remanding Penn-Olin:
Their economic significance has grown tremendously in
the last score of years, having been spurred on by the
need for speed and size in fashioning a war machine during
the early forties. Post-war use of joint subsidiaries and
joint projects led to the spawning of thousands of such
ventures in an effort to perform the commercial tasks
confronting an expanding economy.
14
The second was succinctly stated by Paul Rand Dixon:
Perhaps the real impetus for the relatively recent and
very substantial increase in joint ventures in this country
11. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 919, 934 (D. Del.
1965).
12. Dixon, Joint Ventures: What is their Impact on Competition?, 7
ANTrRUST BULL. 398 (1962); for a more complete background see Jaeger,
Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9 AM. U.L. REV. 2 (1960).
13. Bachman, Joint Ventures in Light of Recent Antitrust Develop-
ment: Joint Ventures in the Chemical Industry, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 7
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Bachman].
14. United States v. Penn Olin Co., 378 U.S. 169 (1964).
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was the combinations successfully used by the big oil
companies for exploiting the oil resources of the Middle
East. 15
Economic advantages and disadvantages
The increased concern of the Government and the increased in-
terest of business in joint ventures emerges when one views the
advantages and disadvantages of this form of organization. The
economic advantages are numerous: (1) sharing of technology;
(2) securing managerial talent; (3) the broadening of research and
development activities; (4) the gaining of new sales outlets; (5) new
and improved sources for obtaining raw materials; (6) to prevent
discrimination against sole ownership by foreign firms; 16 (7) the
creation of new competitive vigor; (8) the reduction of capital out-
lay; (9) the sharing of risks; (10) the economics of large scale
enterprise; 17 (11) overcoming barriers to entry;"' (12) the combin-
ing of credit lines;' 9 (13) a broader range of experience in produc-
tion and marketing;2 0 and (14) an increased rate of return.
21
Two of these advantages were important points of controversy
in Penn-Olin. The first was whether joint ventures contribute
new competitive vigor and, if so, whether Penn-Olin did. In gen-
eral, where companies cannot reasonably surmount barriers to
entry individually, a joint venture may not only enter success-
fully, but also force the established competitors to compete more
vigorously. Conversely, it can be argued that in the absence of the
joint venture greater competition would result if both firms en-
tered, or if one firm entered while the other maintained an interest
in entering. As a result of this controversy, the concept of poten-
tial competition was developed in Penn-Olin to help determine the
joint venture's competitive impact on the relevant market.22 The
second, whether attaining a specific rate of return above that ob-
tainable by independent entry, where that independent rate of re-
turn is "reasonable," was a valid motive for joint entry? Rate of
return is usually not listed as a separate advantage since it is
15. Dixon, supra note 12, at 398.
16. Bachman, supra note 13, at 8 (reasons 1-6 inclusive).
17. Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification,
and Joint Ventures, 15 VA. L. Ray. 442 (1963) (reasons 7-10 inclusive).
18. Comment, The Corporate Joint Venture Under the Antitrust Laws,
37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 712 (1962).
19. Berghoff, Antitrust Aspects of Joint Ventures, 9 ANTiTRUST BULL.
232 (1964).
20. Comment, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 26 OHIO ST. L.J.
440 (1965).
21. Comment, The Joint Venture Meets Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Technical Capability, Reasonable Probability and Business Reality, 38 S.
CAL. L. Rav. 104 (1965). This article stresses the importance of rate of
return as a criterion for new investments and therefore as a criterion for
independent entry. Id. at 114.
22. For a discussion of potential competition, see p. 642 infra.
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basically a function of the other advantages previously listed. How-
ever, the importance Olin and Pennsalt attached to rate of return
necessitates its treatment as a major criterion for determining
whether individual entry was reasonably probable.
2
Although the joint venture can provide a convenient and prof-
itable way of accomplishing the large-scale economic tasks of the
twentieth century, disadvantages may result both for the parents
and the public interest. The parents may have difficulties in har-
monizing business philosophies, creating long range objectives,
formulating business policy, and reducing day-to-day internal
friction caused by the common management of the partners.
24
By tending to limit present or potential competition, or both,
joint ventures may injure the public.25 The new corporation re-
sulting from the combined efforts of the parents may dominate, or
tend to dominate, a product or industry by forcing smaller firms
out of business or by creating a source of wealth not available to
competitors. This wealth is embodied in substantial market power
which may lead to monopoly conditions in one or more markets.
26
Competition, moreover, may be lessened when potential com-
petition is eliminated.2 7 This results where one parent would have
entered the market while the other remained at the edge, threat-
ening to enter.28 Other companies as well may be deterred from
entering where the size of the joint venture is disproportionately
large as compared to the original competitors in the market. The
joint participation may also lead to reciprocity between the par-
ents in other competitive produce areas which in turn can lessen
competition.29 The public may also be adversely affected where
the joint venture is precluded from entering the product markets
of the parents.
30
In weighing the joint venture's competitive effect, the problem
is one of assessing potential advantages and disadvantages from
the point of view of the public interest.31 Due to sparse data on
joint ventures to date, this weighing process must be on a case-by-
case basis. The extensive litigation in Penn-Olin provides a forum
for developing and organizing criteria by which to judge the
competitive impact of joint ventures. The Supreme Court's 1964
consideration of the problem raised hopes that concrete standards
would be developed in this "test" case. As the following analysis
23. For a discussion of rate of return see 644 infra.
24. Tractenburg, supra note 4, at 797.
25. Bachman, supra note 13, at 9.
26. KAYSEN AND TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY AN EcONOWC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 136 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Kaysen and Turner].
27. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
28. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
29. KAYSEN AND TURNER, supra note 26 at 441, 442.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 137-138.
[Vol. 72
Summer 1968]
will indicate, however, the recent split memorandum decision 32 of
the Supreme Court substantially mitigates the effectiveness of the
criteria delineated in the Court's initial remanding of the case.
HISTORY OF PENN-OLIN
District Court-1963
On May 1, 1963, the district court handed down its ruling on
Penn-Olin.3 The issue as determined by the court was:
[W]hether, based upon relevant economic factors, the
formation of Penn-Olin has resulted, or as a reasonable
probability will result, in a substantial lessening of com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in sodium chlorate in
the southeastern part of the United States.
3 4
It found that the joint venture did not as a matter of reasonable
probability substantially lessen competition.
In determining the immediate competitive effects on the rele-
vant market, the court first considered what it termed "concentra-
tion of power." 3 This is an inquiry frequently made in merger
cases to determine whether a merger will tend to cause the great
corporate wealth in an industry to rest in the hands of a few firms.36
The court noted that Penn-Olin was a novel situation since one
competitor was not trying to increase its competitive power
through the acquisition of another.17 The purpose for joining, the
court found, was not to preempt a market that the parent firms
occupied, but to enter a market controlled by two firms.3 8
The next factor considered by the court concerned the Gov-
ernment's assertion that Olin is now a captive buyer from Penn-
Olin whereas previously Olin had been a customer of the other
competitor's product.3 9 Finding no anti-competitive impact on
the relevant market, the court decided that the suppliers from
whom Olin buys sodium chlorate must be determined in the best
32. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
33. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
34. Id. at 124 (emphasis added). The relevant market was agreed
to be the southeastern part of the United States. Although not a problem
in this case, determining the relevant market is often crucial in antitrust
cases. For an excellent discussion of the legal and economic problems
involved in defining the relevant market see M. MASSELL, COMPETITION
AND MONOPOLY 245 (Anchor Books ed. 1964).
35. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 125 (D. Del.
1963).
36. Congress saw the process of concentration as a dynamic force,
and section 7 provided the method of breaking this force at its outset and
before it gathered momentum. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S.
294, 317-18 (1962).
37. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
38. Id.
39. Post-Trial Brief for the United States at 24, United States v. Penn-
Olin, 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
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interests of Olin's stockholders and that it was reasonably prob-
able Olin would not restrict its buying to Penn-Olin.40 The court
also found that Penn-Olin's plant size and capacity were not dis-
proportionately large when compared to the other competitors in
the market.
41
Having determined that the joint venture had no adverse af-
fect on existing competition, the district court directed its atten-
tion to the joint venture's effect on potential competition.
42  It
found that the size of Penn-Olin would not lead to future domina-
tion of the market and that Penn-Olin would not deter other firms
from entering the market as evidenced by Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Company's entry after the joint venture agreement.48 Finally, the
court discussed potential competition as it related to Olin and
Pennsalt. Although both firms were capable of entering and had
been interested in entering, the court held that it was impossible
to conclude that "both" Pennsalt and Olin would have con-
structed plants in the absence of their joint venture.4 4  Entry
by one firm was not considered important since one firm would be
equal, at best, to the joint venture. Therefore, the court concluded,
there would be no substantial lessening of competition.
Supreme Court-1964
After finding that section 7 applied to joint ventures, the
Supreme Court determined that the criteria developed in merger
cases generally applies to joint ventures. 45 The crucial issue for
the Court was whether Penn-Olin eliminated potential competition
of a corporation at the edge of the market, continually threaten-
ing to enter.46 Ruling that the district court erred in its consid-
eration of potential competition, the Court remanded for a de-
termination of whether one company would probably have en-
tered while the other remained a significant potential competitor.
47
To aid the trial court in assessing the probability of a sub-
stantial lessening of competition, the following criteria were enu-
merated:
[T] he number and power of the competitors in the relevant
40. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. at 126 (D. Del. 1963).
41. Id. For other possible anti-competitive effects not discussed by
the court see, Post-Trial Brief for the United States at 24, United States v.
Penn-Olin, 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
42. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 126 (D. Del. 1963).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 130.
45. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 171 (1964). The
Court said that overall, the same considerations apply to joint ventures as
to mergers, for in each instance we are but expounding a national policy
enunciated by the Congress to preserve and promote a free competitive
economy.
46. Id. at 173.
47. Id. at 175-176.
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market; the background of their growth; the power of
the joint ventures; the relationship of their lines of com-
merce; the competition existing between them and the
power of each in dealing with the competitors of the other;
the setting in which the joint venture was created; the
joint venture's line of commerce and the relationship
thereof to that of its parents; the adaptability of its line of
commerce to noncompetitive practices; the potential power
of the joint venture in the relevant market; an appraisal
of what the competition in the relevant market would have
been if one of the joint venturers had entered it alone in-
stead of through Penn-Olin; the effect, in the event of this
occurrence, of the other joint venturers potential competi-
tion; and such other factors as might indicate potential
risk to competition in the relevant market. In weighing
these factors the court should remember that the man-
date of the Congress is in terms of the probability of a
lessening of substantial competition, not in terms of tangi-
ble present restraint.
4
District Court on Remand-1965
On remand, the district court separated the issues into three
parts.49 First, whether either parent would have entered in the
absence of the joint venture. Secondly, if one parent would have
entered, whether the other would have maintained sufficient inter-
est to be considered a significant potential competitor. Thirdly,
whether it was reasonably probable that the entry of Penn-Olin
resulted in substantially less competition than would have ex-
isted if either parent had entered while the other continued to have
an interest in entering.
In deciding Olin would not have entered independently, the
court traced the sequence of events comprising the corporation's
investment decisions concerning the southeast sodium chlorate
market.50 He stressed the different levels of management involved
in decision making and the manner in which new investment
projects were formulated and investigated. 51 Through this anal-
ysis the court discussed the desired rates of return, market ex-
pectations, and reasons for the joint venture's existence.52 After
scrutinizing the feelings of "top management," the court con-
cluded that they were pessimistic about independent entry.53 In
view of past decisions, top management's feelings, rate of return
estimates, and the future market outlook, the court concluded that
48. Id. at 177.
49. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 246 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Del.
1965).
50. Id. at 919. It was assumed by this point that both Olin and Penn-
salt had the capability to proceed alone.
51. Id. at 919-20.




it was not reasonably probable Olin would have entered alone. 54
The same approach was used in evaluating Pennsalt's probable
independent entry. 5 Based on previous decisions, statements by
management, rate of return estimates, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass's
entry, the court concluded that Pennsalt would not have en-
tered alone.56 Since it found that neither company would have
entered independently, the court felt there was no necessity to dis-
cuss the remaining two issues.57
Supreme Court-1967
In a split memorandum decision affirming the district court,
the Supreme Court ended seven years of litigation by refusing to
find any violation of section 7.58 Unfortunately, it has not clarified
the problems involved in joint venture cases. In its brief the
Government contended that the district court used the wrong
criteria by stressing the subjective feelings of top management. 59
The companies argued that the question was one of fact and not
law.60 They also stressed that the court must look at the condi-
tions of the market following the joint venture.61
The silence of the Supreme Court in the split memorandum
decision makes it difficult to understand how the subjective ap-
proach of the district court relates to and is consonant with the
previous efforts of the Supreme Court to establish objective stand-
ards. The problem remains: what criteria should be used to
determine whether it is reasonably probable a joint venture sub-
stantially lessens competition? The following discussion will eval-
uate the criteria and approaches used in Penn-Olin, their relevance
and effectiveness and will make some suggestions relevant to fu-
ture joint venture litigation.
TRADITIONAL MERcER APPROACH AND ITS APPLICATION
TO JOINT VENTURES
In its post-trial brief,6 2 the Government listed and examined
several ways in which the joint venture would have present and
future anti-competitive effects in the relevant market. The dis-
trict court emphasized three: concentration of power, Olin as a
captive buyer, and plant size.6 The other effects noted by the Gov-
54. Id. at 928.
55. Id. at 928-934.
56. Id. at 934.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 386 U.S. 906 (1967).
59. Brief for the United States at 29-30, United States v. Penn-Olin
Co., 386 U.S. 906 (1967).
60. United States v. Penn-Olin, 36 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1967).
61. Id.
62. Post-Trial Brief for the United States at 12-24, United States v.
Penn-Olin Co., 117 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
63. Supra at p. 637.
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ernment pertained to efforts made by Olin and Pennsalt to develop
better production methods for sodium chlorate. This research was
abandoned when the two corporations agreed to form the joint
venture.
The Government's method of attacking Penn-Olin is best de-
scribed as piecemeal. Each possible economic impact of the joint
venture was separated and analyzed to determine whether competi-
tion may be lessened. This approach is employed most frequently
in merger litigation where the impact of the merger would be to
reduce the number of firms in the market, or at best, allow the
number to remain the sameY4 The joint venture, on the other
hand, increases the number of firms in the market. Therefore, it
will be more difficult to prove a substantial lessening of competi-
tion where the criteria for such an evaluation is set against the
added competitive vigor created by a joint venture. For exam-
ple, the concentration of power test is more effective with mer-
gers than with joint ventures because the financial, technological
and managerial power of the combining firms is fully integrated.
In the merger situation the Government is in a better position to
argue that the fully integrated power will be brought to bear in the
market to the detriment of competition. As there is an incomplete
integration of the parents in a joint venture, it is more difficult
to prove that the power available to the parents will be focused
on the joint venture's market.
The Supreme Court, although recognizing the differences be-
tween the two forms of organization, concluded that the same
considerations apply to mergers and joint ventures. In each in-
stance, the Court is following the policy set forth by Congress of
preserving and promoting a free competitive economy.6 5 Several of
the criteria established by the Supreme Court would be used in a
piecemeal approach to determine the present and future effect of
the joint venture in the relevant market: (1) the number and power
of competitors in the relevant market; (2) the background of their
growth; (3) the power of the joint venturers; (4) the relationship
of their lines of commerce; (5) the competition existing between
them and the power of each in dealing with the competitors of
the other; (6) the reasons and necessities for its existence; (7) the
joint venture's line of commerce and the relationship thereof to
the parents; (8) the adaptability of its line of commerce to non-
64. A majority of the individual criteria used in the piecemeal ap-
proach can be found in: B. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: A GUIDE TO AN
ECONownc ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 54 (2d ed. 1962); Phillips and Hall,
Economic and Legal Aspects of Merger Litigation, 14 U. HousToN Bus.
REV. 35-43 (1963).
65. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 170 (1964). For material
discussing the differences between joint ventures and mergers on hori-
zontal, vertical and conglomerate levels see Comment, Joint Ventures and
Antitrust Policy, supra note 23, at 455; Bachman, Joint Ventures and the
Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 659 (1965); Bachman, supra note 13, at 9.
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competitive practices; and (9) any other factors which might be
relevant"6 such as changes in the charter of price competition,
6 7
barriers to enter,68 and rate of growth of industry or market.69
It is submitted that while the competitive effects of mergers
and joint ventures are similar, there are significant differences.
The merger may reduce the number of firms and create powerful
leverage for the merged firms in the relevant market. The effect
of this strength is to make the market more concentrated with
great power in the merged firms. This power may either have
immediate harmful effects on competition or may tend to lessen
competition in the future. The piecemeal approach is very helpful
in determining whether competition may be lessened for it basi-
cally examines the number of firms in the market in relation to the
distribution of power among them and the effect of the merger
on this structure. The joint venture, on the other hand, is not
likely to have any immediate harmful effects and since it adds a
firm, it may not have any perceptible adverse effect in the future.
The test for joint ventures usually is not whether a joint ven-
ture lessens competition but whether there would have been even
greater competition in the absence of the joint venture. The piece-
meal approach by itself does not solve this question and the
concept of potential competition has been developed to supplement
the piecemeal approach. It should be noted, however, that the
piecemeal approach is helpful in assessing the effect of the power
which a joint venture can bring to bear in the market and should
be used in conjunction with a consideration of potential competi-
tion.
POTENTIAL COMPETITION
The concept of potential competition has been defined as an
existing positive competitive force supplied by the immediate
threat of new entry by an identified firm.7 0  The general im-
portance of potential competition has been recognized as partial
compensation for the imperfect nature of actual competition in the
great majority of competitive markets.7 1  Potential competition
may have the effect of restraining producers from over-charging,
and in general act as a competitive spur.12 Potential competition,
the Supreme Court concluded, cannot be underestimated where
there exists an aggressive, well equipped and well financed cor-
66. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 177 (1964).
67. B. BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: A GUIDE TO AN EcoNo1iwc ANALY-
sIS of CASE LAW 54 (2d ed. 1962).
68. Id. at 63.
69. 1955 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT. COMMIITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
230.
70. Comment, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, supra note 23, at
452.




poration engaged in the same or related lines of commerce wait-
ing anxiously to enter.73 Although in many instances potential
competitors are identifiable, threats from unknown competitors
should also be included. Many companies do not know when and
how new competitors may enter their markets because of the
dynamic trends in technology and growing interest in diversifi-
cation.7 4 One such example of unknown potential competition is
Pittsburgh Plate Glass before it entered the Southeastern sodium
chlorate market. The possibility of unknown as well as known
potential competitors creates a problem in assessing the import-
ance of the identifiable type. How much more competition does
the known competitor promote than the unknown competitor?
The Supreme Court in remanding Penn-Olin overruled the dis-
trict court's holding that potential competition will only be les-
sened where both firms would have entered in the absence of the
joint venture.7 5 To determine if potential competition was fore-
closed, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to ascer-
tain whether either parent would have entered alone; and if so,
ascertain whether the other would have maintained sufficient inter-
est to be considered a significant potential competitor.
76
CRITERIA TO DETERMINE REASONABLE PROBABILITY
OF INDEPENDENT ENTRY BY EITHIR FIRM
(a) capability of entry
The first criteria that must be evaluated is the ability of
either firm to enter the market alone. The 1963 district court
decision concluded that when the joint venture agreement was
signed, Pennsalt and Olin each possessed the resources and general
capability needed to build its own plant and to be viable competi-
tors in the relevant market.77 This was the only criterion on which
the parties in Penn-Olin could eventually agree.
Although the Government at first argued that section 7 only
required it to prove the companies capable of competing individu-
ally, Penn-Olin has established, if nothing else, that something
more than capability is needed to prove that it was reasonably
probable one firm would enter alone.78 How much more is
needed and how it is to be measured are the problems raised by
73. Id.
74. M. MASSELL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 216 (Anchor Books ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as M. MASSELL].
75. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 175 (1964).
76. Id. at 175-176.
77. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 217 F. Supp. 129 (D. Del. 1963).
This capability includes sufficient financial strength, and technological and
human resources to expand into the new product and geographic market.
78. Reply Brief for the United States at 30, United States v. Penn-
Olin Co., 117 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963).
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the 1965 district court decision and the argument before the Su-
preme Court in December of 1967.
(b) interest in entry and the historical trend approach
The increment in addition to capability which must be exam-
ined has been called interest, incentive or desire of the firm for
independent entry. The Government, using the word incentive,
asserted that incentive is established where there exists a sus-
tained interest in the market and ultimate actual entry, albeit
through a joint venture.09 This test of incentive, however, could
result in a per se determination that any firm which had the incen-
tive to participate in a joint venture would also have the incen-
tive to enter individually. As one writer has indicated, "it would
be difficult to imagine a typical joint venture situation where in-
terest in individual entry had not been present until . . . in-
dividual entry was rejected in favor of entry by joint venture." 0
In order to demonstrate the deterioration of Olin and Penn-
salt's interest in independent entry, the defense used a historical
trend approach which was adopted by the district court. The dis-
trict court traced the time and events which comprised the com-
panies' investment decisions concerning the Southeast sodium chlo-
rate market.8' This approach in determining interest is highly sub-
jective, relying primarily on the opinions of top management as to
what would have been done if there were no joint venture. The
courts and the public interest should not have to depend on the
subjective statements of managers who have an understandable
desire to see the joint venture succeed.
(c) investment process analysis
The "interest in individual entry" standard has developed
through Penn-Olin to be a vague indicator of what Olin or Pennsalt
would have done in the absence of the joint venture. In order to
resolve this problem, a court should compare in the most objective
manner possible the investment decision of independent entry with
other investments the company normally makes.
The only objective criteria the defense relied on were rate of
returns rejected in previous considerations of individual entry. An
investment process analysis, however, is not simply a study of
percentage of profit per dollar of investment, but involves the en-
tire investment planning process of a company. This analysis
79. Brief for the United States at 30, United States v. Penn-Olin Co.,
386 U.S. 906 (1967).
80. Comment, The Joint Venture Meets Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Technical Capability, Reasonable Probability and Business Reality, 38 S.
CAL. L. REv. 104, 112 (1965).




requires a comparison of past and present investment opportuni-
ties. 2 Would the normal investment standards of the firm have
been attained but for the joint venture? Were the rate of returns
improving or declining when investment in individual entry was
being re-evaluated? What was the outlook for the prospective
economic development of the product?8 It has been suggested
that in cases where company standards have not been determined,
an analysis of other company standards in the same market might
be substituted. 84  As a further check, an investigation of past in-
vestment decisions should be made to determine how consistently
the company has attained the standards it purports to require
projects to meet. Where independent entry does not quite reach
the normal rate of return or is one of many alternative investments
under investigation, the Government should prove those special
circumstances making independent entry especially attractive. The
court, in essence, must put itself in the company's place and de-
termine through the firm's own investment standards whether the
company would be likely to enter alone.
Based on the Supreme Court and district court decisions, the
following factors should be examined to determine the probability
of either parent entering independently: (1) the setting in which
the joint venture was created; (2) the reasons and necessities for its
existence; (3) eagerness of the company to enter and special cir-
cumstances prompting this firm to consider independent entry;
(4) the firm's capability to enter; (5) nearness of the parent to
the relevant market; (6) the nature and extent of the market;
(7) the investment process analysis.
SUBJECTIVE V. OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
On appeal to the Supreme Court in 1967, the Government
contended that the district court applied the wrong standard in
determining probability of entry.8 5 The district court relied heav-
ily on the evidence of management as to their actual intent as com-
pared to what the objective tests showed to be the firms' likely
course of action.
8 6
The Government has expressed sound reasons for minimiz-
ing the emphasis placed on subjective evidence. Objective eco-
nomic evidence is far more probative than the subjective statements
of some management personnel.87 Subjective evidence relies on
82. Comment, The Joint Venture Meets Section 7 of the Clayton Act:
Technical Capability Reasonable Probability, and Business Reality, 38 S.
CAL. L. REV. 104, 114 (1965).
83. Bachman, supra note 13, at 17.
84. Id. at 115.
85. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Penn-Olin Co.,
386 U.S. 906 (1967).
86. Id. at 45.
87. Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Penn-Olin Co.,
386 U.S. 906 (1967).
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the hypothetical judgment of interested parties who are desirous
of seeing the joint venture continue. Choosing the joint venture
rather than independent entry indicated management's preference.
But, this choice does not prove that independent entry would
have been rejected even if the joint venture had not been under
consideration. It is the court, not management, which has the
responsibility to determine the probability of independent entry.
The court, therefore, should base its decision primarily on the ob-
jective factors presented by both parties.
In the district court's final statement it concludes that even if
Lop management would have approved individual entry, it would
only be conjecture as to what the Board of Directors would have
decided."" Such a conclusion is inevitable where no definitive de-
cision concerning independent entry has been made. After hun-
dreds of pages of testimony and other evidence, the ultimate result
using subjective evidence will be that any ruling would be
based on conjecture. This result will not occur where objective
evidence is used. The most poignant reason for avoiding subjec-
tive evidence is that such evidence would frustrate the objec-
tives and enforcement of antitrust policy. 89
The uncertain standard of subjective evidence deprives the
antitrust laws of their predictability. 0 Sound business planning
as well as sound law enforcement is harmed. The Supreme Court
stated in its 1964 decision that potential competition cannot be
put to a subjective test.9 1 In remanding the case, the Court went
on to say that unless we are going to require subjective evidence,
this array of probability (that both were potential entrants) cer-
tainly reaches the prima facie stage.92 The 1964 decision made ad-
mirable strides to set standards and to provide a pattern for
future analysis of joint ventures. By tacitly approving the sub-
jective approach adopted by the district court, the Supreme Court
has frustrated and negated its previous beneficial efforts to de-
velop guidelines for the courts to follow.
During the Government's argument before the Supreme Court,
Justice White expressed concern that management had decided not
to enter alone.9 3 He indicated that the Government may have
been trying to over-ride a clear-cut decision by management with
economic factors.9 4 The district court, however, clearly established
that the possibility of individual entry had not been completely
rejected by either company before they decided upon the joint yen-
88. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 246 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1965).
89. Id. at 37.
90. Brief for the United States at 38, United States v. Penn-Olin
Co., 386 U.S. 906 (1967).
91. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 174 (1964).
92. Id. at 175.





ture.95 Unless each company had unequivocally abandoned all
consideration of individual entry prior to serious consideration of
the joint venture, the Government should be permitted to prove
that it was reasonably probable for one of the firms to enter alone
in the absence of the joint venture. Where a joint venture and
individual entry are being considered contemporaneously, a pre-
sumption should arise that individual entry was possible in the ab-
sence of the joint venture. Thereafter, the Government has the
burden of proving that the possibility of individual entry was,
in fact, reasonably probable based on objective economic standards.
Although recognizing the need for objective standards, the
Government did not proceed far enough in delineating the proper
criteria. The Government included capability, incentive and spe-
cial circumstances making the market attractive to the firm in ques-
tion.96 In determining incentive the Government emphasized the
firms' ability to earn a reasonable profit. The Government
should have been more explicit as to what constitutes a "reason-
able" profit. Is "reasonable" what the company normally requires,
what their direct competitors average, or what the industry ave-
rages? Since the courts must determine whether particular firms
may enter, the Government should have defined "reasonable" as
generally what the firm earns on its investments. The Govern-
ment, thereafter, should emphasize, as it did, that "reasonable"
may be below company standards where there are special circum-
stances making entry attractive. For example, independent entry
in one market may provide a convenient base from which to enter
other related markets or to get those buyers in the existing mar-
ket to purchase other products which the firm may have to sell.
As previously suggested, profit (rate of return) is one part of any
over-all consideration of a firm's objective investment process.97
In any case, what is reasonable can and must be based on objective
factors. The savoir faire of key personnel for investment deci-
sions may be important to the company, but it cannot be used as a
basis for deciding complicated antitrust cases where the public
interest is so greatly affected.
POST-JOINT VENTURE EVIDENCE
Antitrust cases, on the average, have taken five and a half
years to complete. 98 Penn-Olin required seven years before liti-
gation was completed. A problem arises as to whether post-ac-
quisition facts not apparent at the time of the venture should be
utilized in determining the competitive effect of a joint venture.
95. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 117 F. Supp. 128, 129 (D. Del. 1963).
No facts added in the 1965 decision would change this conclusion.
96. Brief for the United States at 38-39, United States v. Penn-Olin
Co., 386 U.S. 906 (1967).
97. Supra at p. 644.
98. M. MASF.LL, supra note 174, at 130.
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The defense argued that facts which develop after the joint ven-
ture agreement should be relevant in deciding a joint venture
caseY0 It was stressed that the sodium chlorate market was rela-
tively small in gross tonnage and that only a few producers were
needed to supply the market. The costs of a plant were not ab-
solutely high, but high relative to the size of the market. The de-
fense also contended that by 1964 the market had fully developed,
because the pulp and paper companies had completed switching to
sodium chlorate.
Post-acquisition data have not been favorably viewed in con-
glomerate or product-extension mergers, and there are no com-
pelling reasons why this view should be altered. When the court
of appeals in F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble relied heavily on post-
acquisition evidence to show that the merger had no harmful
effects, the Supreme Court reversed saying that the court of
appeals had misapprehended the standards applicable in a section
7 proceeding. 10 0 Section 7, the Court noted, deals with probabili-
ties and not certainties, and therefore, there is definitely no re-
quirement that the anti-competitive power manifest itself in anti-
competitive action before section 7 can be called into play.' 0'
Justice Harlan, concurring, went farther saying that post-combina-
tion evidence (as the Commission found) was generally irrele-
vant and proper only in the unusual case in which the struc-
ture of the market has changed radically since the merger.10 2 Jus-
tice Harlan concluded that post-combination evidence would hin-
der effective enforcement and not allow businessmen to plan their
actions with a fair degree of certainty. 0 3
In Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp.10 4
the Supreme Court did not eliminate all evaluation of post-ac-
quisition data, but concluded that if such evidence was given con-
clusive weight, then merged companies could bide their time until
reciprocity (in Penn-Olin, the elimination of potential competi-
tion) was allowed fully to bloom. 1 5
The evidence under consideration should be restricted as much
as possible to within the time the joint venture is created. After
many years of appeal, the market may no longer be capable of
99. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 36 U.S.L.W. 3234, 3235 (U.S. Dec.
12, 1967) (no. 22).
100. F.T.C. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 576 (1966).
101. Id. at 577.
102. Id. at 591.
103. Id. at 592.
104. F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 598 (1965).
105. Several merger cases have already used potential competition as
an indicator of an alleged antitrust violation. See F.T.C. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 576 (1966); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl. Bank, 277 F.
Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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supporting another competitor. This hindsight should not affect
a court's decision, but rather affect the judicial action taken af-
ter a decision is reached. Much as character and reputation are
used to mitigate punishment, so should post-joint venture evi-
dence be used. The problem of post-combination evidence would
not arise if antitrust cases were dealt with swiftly. The fault
does not arise from the criteria used to find a violation, but from
the nature of the antitrust laws and the legal procedures used to
enforce them. Only through legislative refinement will the prob-
lem be resolved. The courts, meanwhile, should not be asked to
distort the standards used to find section 7 violations by relying on
post-acquisition evidence.
CRITERIA TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE OTHER FIRM- WOULD REMAIN
A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL COMPETITOR
Because this issue was never reached, Penn-Olin did not de-
velop any criteria by which to determine if a firm would remain a
significant potential competitor. 0 6 There are, however, certain
basic criteria which should be considered. The court should care-
fully examine the nature and extent of the market. This market
analysis would include a prediction as to whether the degree of
concentration was such as to warrant a firm in remaining at the
edge of the market. The ability of actual competitors in the mar-
ket to recognize this firm as a potential competitor may also be
important. Finally, the court should consider those special circum-
stances which would continue to make the market attractive to
the alleged potential competitor.
CONCLUSION
Penn-Olin is by most standards the "big" case for implanting
a foundation on which other joint venture cases will build. At
this stage, joint ventures need to be given much thought in relation
to their place in our free competitive economy. As has been said
for conglomerate mergers and which applies equally as well to joint
ventures, these combinations involve concepts of economic power
and competitive effect that are still largely unformulated. Cases
concerned with their competitive effect demand full investigation
and analysis, whatever the cost in delay or immediate ineffective-
ness of the antitrust laws. Today, many authors are arguing that
the volumes of economic fact used in deciding an antitrust case
are choking the effectiveness of the law. 0 7 They argue that at
least for mergers, guidelines and rules of thumb are needed in-
stead of relying on the "big" case. As for joint ventures, such aims
are impossible until the courts establish the basic patterns for
interpretation. It is regrettable that the positive efforts made in
106. United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 246 F. Supp. 934 (1965).
107. See Bok, supra note 3.
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the 1964 Supreme Court decision were frustrated by the split mem-
orandum decision in 1967. Until the courts begin to delineate
basic objective standards for measuring the competitive effect of
joint ventures, the meaningfulness and workability of potential
competition as an antitrust concept remains in doubt.
GEORGE K. MEIER
